A response to 'Kiev: a case against arms'

A recent op-ed entitled “Kiev: a case against arms” by Sam Berzok argues that the United States should reject proposals to arm Kiev’s government in its war against Russian-backed separatists in southeastern Ukraine.A number of arguments lead the author to this conclusion. First, targeted economic sanctions that followed Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, in conjunction with plummeting oil prices, have already sufficiently weakened the Kremlin. Second, the United States’ absence from the marathon negotiations that yielded the already imperiled ceasefire of Feb. 12 reflects how peripheral the conflict is to U.S. interests. Third, the Kremlin’s support of the separatists is and will remain “limited,” and Kiev therefore stands a chance to unify the country without external military support. The author then prescribes a solution based on negotiations between Kiev and the separatists, commitment to the ceasefire and mutual assistance to Ukraine through a partnership between Russia and the West. A misreading of the events of the past year, however, hinders this argument. While only those with an intimate knowledge of the Ukrainian military and the weapons systems available for transfer can definitively argue in favor of arming Ukraine, the option must remain on the table.

In “Kiev: a case against arms,” the author depicts an endangered Kremlin, possibly on the brink of social upheaval thanks to harsh economic circumstances. The Russian economy is indeed doomed, but Putin’s position is hardly threatened. A January poll from the respected Levada Center attributes to Putin an astronomical 85 percent approval rating, up a full 20 percent from one year ago. And what of the opposition, the potential “liberal spark” the author suggests might rise against Putin’s regime? Most Western observers have cast anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny into that role, but according to Levada Center data, approximately 50 percent of Russians have never even heard of him. Further, in response to Navalny’s recent prison sentence for trumped-up embezzlement charges, of those who heard about the sentence, only 27 percent considered the ruling “too harsh” or “unfair,” while 73 percent were satisfied or declared it “too lenient.” Perhaps more telling, over half of Russians today hold the view that there is no alternative to Vladimir Putin, almost double the response from last year. This is not to say that Putin is a ruler who meets the needs of the Russian people. Rather, what lies between Putin’s ratings and the lack of viable opposition bodes far more ominously for the hope of a democratic revival -- since coming to power, Putin has waged a highly effective and intensifying campaign against Russia’s independent media. While a weakened ruble has undoubtedly hurt the average Muscovite’s pursuit of a new iPhone 6, the Kremlin’s tight control over Russian media means that the international community cannot wait for economic circumstances to induce popular unrest as a solution to the Ukraine crisis.

The op-ed also mistakenly presents the Ukraine conflict as inessential to U.S. interests, presenting as evidence the United States’ absence from recent negotiations. First, the United States does not control its own inclusion in international formats of negotiation. The recent quadripartite format, also known as the “Normandy Four,” was largely organized by France, a country with some of the most significant cultural and economic ties to Russia, as well one of the most lenient towards Russia in Europe -- the United States likely had little leverage to enter the talks anyway. Second, policymakers should not let Ukraine’s marginal economic and political clout obscure the significance of Russia’s invasion of a sovereign European state. Russian aggression in Ukraine disrupts the crucial principle of post-World War II security: that European borders shall not be changed by force. Allowing Russia to continue unabated not only risks Ukraine’s democratic promise, but also encourages Putin to try the same tactics in the Baltics or Kazakhstan the next time he wants Russians to rally around the flag.

The author also claims that, despite Russian support, “the Ukrainian military holds the potential to repel the rebels and re-unify the country.” The events of this past summer show that it does not. In April, the Ukrainian government launched its “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) against rebel forces in the town of Slovyansk. As the ATO’s efforts began to yield results, the separatists’ Kremlin handlers simply ratcheted up support. By August, Russian paratroopers were “accidentally” crossing the border into Ukraine. According to a recent Brookings report, Ukraine subsequently lost “well over half” of its deployed armor. A stalemate is exactly what Putin wants -- a frozen conflict to fester like a wound that infects any chance of Ukrainians deciding to join the European Union. On this point, let us not fall into the Kremlin’s trap of considering EU expansion “dangerous” to Russia. The transformation of the Baltics from Soviet vassals into European states proves the benefits EU accession provides for democracy, rule of law and human rights.

The logic of arming Ukraine does not necessitate that the Ukrainian military, even with American weapons, needs to be capable of defeating the regionally superior Russian military. Rather, providing the Ukrainian military with the means to repel Russian incursions would act to deter future aggression and raise the cost of the Kremlin’s attempts to keep its war quiet. As long as Russian soldiers operate unhindered in eastern Ukraine, Russia’s media machine can continue to churn out disinformation about their presence. In a November Levada Center survey, 53 percent of Russians did not think Russian soldiers were operating in Ukraine, versus only 25 percent who did. The Kremlin’s motive behind lying to its citizens about Russia’s direct involvement in Ukraine is clear: Russians are not willing to risk the lives of their sons and brothers in this war. Increasing Ukraine’s capabilities would render such a disinformation campaign impossible as more and more Russian mothers are told their sons died in “training accidents,” when in reality they were sent to Donbas to die for Putinism. This is not the first time Putin’s Russia has destabilized a neighboring state. The West cannot repeat its inaction after Russia’s 2008 war in Georgia. This time, the threat is at Europe’s doorstep and arms must remain on the table.