The Obama administration's China policy came under scrutiny again — this time over Taiwan.
On Thursday, word had gotten out that the White House, after much waffling, had finally decided to sell a new arms package to Taiwan which did not include the new F−16 C/D fighter planes that Taiwan and Congress had been pressing for. This was interpreted as kowtowing to China, which views the island as a renegade province and opposes U.S. arms sales. Later, the administration was read as intervening in Taiwanese domestic politics when an unnamed official signaled that electing Taiwan's opposition party could raise tensions with China.
These criticisms may seem far too partisan. Every president seeks to balance U.S. interests under severe constraints. Previous administrations have faced questions about their commitment to Taiwan, and the Obama administration has at least approved some arms sales to Taiwan while trying not to incur the wrath of Beijing. Besides, the comments of one U.S. official do not represent U.S. policy, and several senior administration officials had made assurances that Washington would remain neutral with regard to Taiwan's upcoming elections.
Nonetheless, every administration, including this one, must remember that on Taiwan, as with many other foreign policy issues, perceptions matter as much as, if not more than realities. This means keeping three things in mind:
First, treating Taiwan purely as an issue to manage and an appendage of U.S.−China relations understates the independent importance of Taiwan to U.S. ideals. Taiwan is, among other things, the United States' ninth−largest trading partner, a model democratic nation in Asia, a key shipping hub and home to some of the world's most vibrant companies. The loss of Taiwan to China would also undermine U.S. interests, since Chinese control of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait would enhance Chinese naval superiority. And, while arms sales often anger China, its actual response has been limited merely to harsh words and a temporary suspension of some joint military activities. In other words, the United States has a stake in the future of its ally and should support it for its own sake.
Second, the U.S. commitment is not just an act of debating about legislative wording or doling out periodical assistance, but a fundamental commitment to the people of Taiwan. Even as positive developments continue between Beijing and Taipei, China's military buildup is continuing and the People's Liberation Army's assets are still directed toward Taiwan. In this environment, arms sales are designed both to help Taiwan defend itself as the cross−strait military balance tips in Beijing's favor and to give Taiwan confidence in negotiations with the mainland. Since China's intentions remain uncertain, Taipei must have to both negotiate from a position of strength and have the tools to defend itself if needed.
Third, how an administration deals with Taiwan is seen as a general marker for how the United States deals with China and treats its allies. Early on, when this administration attempted to placate China by being more "sensitive" to Chinese reservations on issues like Taiwan, it failed to gain concessions and eventually switched to a tougher stance in the face of China's more aggressive territorial claims which spooked Washington's allies and friends. It is clear that China has strategic interests irrespective of what the U.S. position is on Taiwan, and that Beijing intends on pursuing them. While U.S.−China cooperation may be desirable, the United States should not be naive about its potential and should pursue its interests and stay true to its allies. In a world where the future of China's rise remains uncertain, doubt surrounding Washington's commitment could make the world a much more unstable and militarized place.
Taiwan is important enough to be made an independent priority in American foreign policy. U.S. administrations would do well to ensure that this is reflected both in perception and reality.
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