The Obama administration announced on Monday that financial sanctions it imposed last month against Moussa Koussa, Libya's former foreign minister, have been dropped. The move follows Koussa's recent defection to the United Kingdom. Despite being free at the moment, Koussa has not been granted immunity regarding any possible criminal charges. So long as it follows certain conditions, the removal is a positive move by the administration.
Koussa's reward was issued as a way to encourage other Qaddafi officials to follow suit. The financial sanctions against Libya and its leaders have served as a tool to weaken Libya economically. Now they will also be used as leverage against Qaddafi, enticing his top officials to resign and defect.
Evidence is mounting that there is much internal conflict within Qaddafi's camp. There is speculation that one of Qaddafi's seven sons will eventually replace him as leader. There seems to be little agreement on which of his sons it will be, though Seif al−Islam, who is relatively moderate, is the apparent frontrunner. Regardless, it seems as though a relative stalemate has arisen between Qaddafi's forces and the rebels, with NATO unwilling to pursue more intrusive military intervention. For these reasons, a strategy with the objective of undermining Qaddafi's rule is wise.
Notwithstanding the strategically beneficial aspects of dropping the sanctions, there are moral issues that must be addressed. Koussa is widely suspected of being behind the 1988 airplane bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 270 people, mostly Americans. He has also been implicated for helping to supply terrorist groups with weapons, notably the Irish Republican Army. As Libya's ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1980, Koussa publicly approved of his country's practice of hunting down and murdering Qaddafi opponents worldwide.
At first blush, this seems like the last man the United States should be assisting in a graceful, dignified step−down from power. The European Union, in fact, has maintained sanctions on his assets on its side of the Atlantic. But immunity for any of Koussa's offenses has not been granted. Koussa fled to London of his own accord and can still be tried. And if the unfreezing of the former leader's U.S. assets spark further defection, then it is not only an acceptable move to make but a prudent one.
Using Koussa's case as an example, the administration is attempting to indirectly debilitate Qaddafi and his regime. With the international community almost certainly unwilling to invade or take military action beyond the no−fly zone and naval embargo, the sanctions are an effective supplement. Using them in this new dimension will also be a useful way to help dismantle Qaddafi's loosening grip on Libya.
It is clear that such dealings could become rife with corruption if not handled correctly. So far, however, it seems as though the administration and foreign governments have been handling the issue in good faith. If the international community follows the pattern begun with Koussa, in which no immunity was granted to a man once referred to as the "envoy of death" by intelligence officials, the strategy will remain effective and morally sound.
