The Democratic Republic of the Congo is ablaze once again, and like many times prior, it is Rwanda and their network of Tutsi militants at the helm of this chaos. The history between the Congo and Rwanda has long been fraught with some of the most destructive violence since World War II, and the recent offensives spearheaded by the March 23 Movement militia and their sponsors, the Rwandan Defense Force, in the eastern reaches of the Congo are clear indicators that the region may be entering yet another horrific period of conflict.
The fates of Rwanda and the Congo have been in lockstep with each other since the Rwandan Genocide, perpetrated by a Hutu majority government in 1994. During and after the genocide, around 2 million Hutu civilians fled to North and South Kivu in the eastern Congo to escape extremist violence, with some extremist elements still managing to slip through the cracks. While the Rwandan Patriotic Front achieved victory against the genocidal Rwandan government, placing a new Tutsi-led government in power, continued suspicion toward the Congo and its supposed harboring of “Hutu extremists” eventually led to Rwanda’s launching of full scale invasions of the Congo, the first two occurring 1996–97 and 1998–2003. Rwanda has continued denying its obvious involvement in two other conflicts led by Rwanda-backed militant groups.
The current iteration of the conflict between the two countries has taken a different form this time, combining large-scale operations by the March 23 Movement militant group with Rwandan boots on the ground. Although Rwandan President Paul Kagame expressed uncertainty about the Rwandan foot soldiers, their presence is pretty much a foregone conclusion. The invasion is also a blatant land- and resource-grab with any previous justifications of snuffing out Hutu extremists being overshadowed by the country’s rapidly growing blood mineral trade.
What is most saddening about the current round of conflict, at least in my opinion, is the lackluster response from, or in some cases outright withdrawal of, peacekeeping forces from around the world — most importantly the Congo’s regional neighbors and those from African intergovernmental organizations. While I personally believe that relying on the physical protection of the United Nations and its Congolese mission is foolhardy in this day and age, it is the countries and groups within the continent whose possible exit from the theater is a lot more disheartening.
It will be the countries neighboring the Congo — many of which already host significant Congolese refugee populations — that will bear the brunt of another crisis in the Congo. Some of these countries are attempting to mediate the conflict through active diplomacy or to provide aid to fleeing civilians, but more proactive action is needed to stamp out armed groups that are clearly pursuing ulterior motives and directed by foreign entities. Uganda has taken a more proactive role in pacifying the present mayhem, deploying more than 1000 troops into active conflict since the start of 2025. This support is few and far between, though, and if countries like South Africa and Malawi continue to withdraw their peacekeeping troops, then the Congo may be forced to turn to far more unpleasant sources for help.
Under these circumstances, and with headlines sprouting up about a possible mineral deal on the horizon between the Congo and the United States — a deal that could mirror a similarly proposed deal with Ukraine — it is hard to miss the vultures circling. American and Congolese politicians have, since February, been in talks about a possible critical mineral-for-security deal, though so far, there is little solid information about such a deal. I personally scoff at the fallacy of an American security umbrella over the Congo as a supposed outcome of what will most likely be lopsided commercial ties. This is speculation on my part, but I do not believe that any resource-for-security deal that the Congo makes in their current predicament will be likely to favor them. Intelligence analysts have pointed out that such guarantees would most likely take the form of material support for — or training of — Congolese troops, as opposed to any direct intervention.
Even though the Congo is said to be pushing for such a deal, I cannot see how this would be any different from their current arrangements with China. Beijing has, for roughly two decades, held extensive mining rights within the Congo in return for aid with expanding Congolese infrastructure. This has been supplemented by military aid, though this has been provided solely in the form of Chinese weaponry and electronic equipment. These weapons have likely changed nothing: Hundreds of armed groups still roam the Congolese countryside, and China’s involvement has seemingly done little to dissuade the ongoing invasion.
The Congo needs direct intervention, not more weapons. According to a report by German outlet DW, the Congolese Armed Forces are currently plagued by deep-rooted corruption, with their commanding class enabling a glorified ‘get-rich-quick’ scheme for elites who are able to obtain high ranks. This is not the only problem that the armed forces face, but it is at the root of the dismal morale and inadequate training of their troops, especially of those stationed in the Kivu regions.
This direct intervention will not come from the United States, it will not come from China, and you can forget about the Congolese government doing anything. The United Nations, while critical in providing humanitarian aid, can also do little to resist Rwanda’s invasion. It must thus be fellow African countries, many of whom have faltered in their support for a prosperous future in the Congo, who must take up the mantle of defense — not only for the Congolese people but also for the stability of the entire African continent.
