This past year, I have been a member of the 2020-21 Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship curriculum that is focused on China and its role in the international system. Through this class, I have been able to explore my interest in international politics, energy policy and economic development.
President Xi Jinpingannounced in September 2020 that China will strengthen its 2030 climate target; the country aims to reach peak emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. These goals were encouraging to climate stakeholders, as China had never made a formal commitment to net-zero emissions before. However, the most recent 5-year plan of the Chinese Community Party (CCP) that lays out the country’s roadmap for economic development is notambitious enough for many climate activists.Researchers have found that, in order to meet the standards of the2015 Paris Agreement, China would have to peak emissions by 2025 instead of the CCP’s current 2030 target, and then drastically reduce emissions thereafter. Much of China’s post-pandemic development has not been green. The CCPapproved three times the number of coal plants in 2020 as it did the year before, which calls into question China’s commitment to declining emissions and carbon neutrality. China is aworld leader in renewables, which has helped to reduce its emissions, but in recent years, the growth of new clean energy capacityhas slowed.
There are a few main drivers and inhibitors behind China’s energy transition. First is their desire for energy security. China’s rapid growth and development since the 1990s have caused its energy demand toskyrocket. The country is currently highly dependent on imports of oil and gas from the Middle East, which reach its borders through seas controlled by the U.S. Navy. If the U.S. were to obstruct access to these imports by naval blockade, it would paralyze China’s economy and military forces. Thus, renewable energy is a mechanism for China to increase energy supply and security within its own borders.
The second driver behind these targets is an effort to confront the health crisis in China, which threatens the legitimacy of the CCP. The number of coal-fired power plants in China, particularly in the developed East, has created major air quality problems that have driven people to environmental mobilization. This has made a public health issue into a political one. In the last 20 years, Beijing has made significantstrides and has been relatively successful in reducing pollution in urban areas tosubdue political unrest.
Ultimately, while the CCP’s energy policy may include favorable language toward renewables and energy marketreforms, their focus is on maintaining stable markets for both renewable energy and the coal sector in China. Although China is an authoritarian state, it is a large and diverse country with many local and regional governments whorely on a robust coal market for economic development. Considering much of the Party’s legitimacyrests on their ability to provide economic development, the CCP will continue to prioritize economic stability over climate-related issues.
On climate issues, China has the ability to build a more positive reputation for itself on the international stage, but it doesn’t look like the CCP is going in that direction. China is one of the largest investors in theArctic, an area with plentiful natural (fossil fuel) resources. Critics of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive infrastructure project in over 60 countries, say that China is essentially exporting its emissions abroad due to the lack of environmental and ecological design requirements in the project. Many Chinese analysts argue that coal is a cheap and efficient way to meeturgent energy needs in parts of Asia that still lack access to electricity. In the long term, coal not only has serious adverse effects on the environment and health outcomes of a population, but the economic case for coal is also beginning toweaken. In my opinion, China’s unsustainable investments into energy internationally further call into question the strength of their commitment to climate within their borders. If China is to reach President Xi’s ambitious targets, it will need to seriously commit to reducing coal production and consumption within its borders.
Please join us for the “Buckling the Belt: Environment and Development and the Belt and Road Initiative” in the EPIIC Symposium (March 18–20, 2021) to discuss drivers and inhibitors of China’s climate policy, as well as the environmental and political implications of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Elena Chavez is a senior studying international relations. Elena can be reached at elena.chavez@tufts.edu.
