If you have been paying any attention to current events this month, you will have heard widespread reports on the abysmal state of Sino-Japanese relations; specifically regarding the history textbook dispute. The Chinese government claims that Japan's recent state-approved history text glosses of Japanese aggression during World War II, including the rape and murder of 300,000 Chinese in the Nanjing Massacre.
The Japanese have now retaliated by voicing their concerns about Chinese history texts. According to the Japanese authorities, Chinese history books are overly nationalistic, needlessly embellish Japanese wartime atrocities, and disregard the poor state of China under Mao Zedong.
Forget the textbook matter. Every history text is filled with lies, misrepresentations and embellishments. History is an art. That is simply the nature of the discipline and precisely the reason why I chose it as the focus of my undergraduate studies at Tufts.
Of course, the history textbook dispute is an oversimplification of the dispute. Even the U.S. media reports that the quarrel over history texts is not the primary source of the current downturn in Sino-Japanese relations. Many international news organizations now assert that worsening Sino-Japanese ties can be traced to China's rising geopolitical aspirations (including their growing thirst for oil) and Japan's fear of losing its role as the supreme economic (and political) force in East Asia.
Media reports have explicitly highlighted the following factors: Japan's pressure on China to revalue their currency (a demand echoed by the United States, European Union and G7 nations), Sino-Japanese territorial disputes, a U.S.-Japanese joint declaration citing the Taiwan issue as a primary security concern in East Asia, Japan's effort to join the U.N. Security Council, frequent visits by Japanese politicians (including Prime Minister Koizumi) to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine (a war memorial which honors Japan's 2.5 million war dead, including convicted war criminals), Japan's decision to offer oil-drilling rights in disputed waters, and the widespread and sometimes violent protests by Chinese university students in cities throughout China.
Or ... perhaps there is something else. It should be noted that the Chinese central government has a great deal of control over protests in Chinese cities. Yes, even the infamous Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 was initiated by Party cadres. Regarding the current wave of anti-Japanese protests gripping China's youth, one cannot ignore the Party's role in the incitement and organization of urban social unrest and its ability to halt any such movements at will (which happened this week when the central government stepped up state censorship of the Internet and SMS messages). So last week's anti-Japanese protests must have initially been permitted, if not instigated, by the Party.
Why would the Chinese government allow this series of events to unfold? A conflict with their East Asian rival would have deleterious effects on the Chinese economy. For one, China is now Japan's largest trading partner. Japanese companies have also invested billions of dollars in China and are a key factor in its rapid economic development.
Perhaps the recent anti-Japanese protests have nothing to do with Japan at all. Although the Communist Party initially based their legitimacy on socialist ideology, their source of power today is rooted in both nationalism and the government's ability to better the lives of the Chinese people. Chinese nationalism comes in various forms. There is the Olympics and spaceship variety. There is the economic variety. And, there is the 'anti' variety (i.e. anti-Japanese, anti-Imperialist, anti-American, etc.).
This last variety was most prevalent in China's early years, both before and after the founding of the People's Republic. It has re-surfaced only in extreme circumstances, such as NATO's "accidental" bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Oops!
China's "anti" nationalism has recently resurfaced in the form of anti-Japanese protests. Is it really because Japan desires a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council? I think not. The Chinese technocratic leadership is among the most pragmatic in the world. Surely China realizes Japan's role as global economic leader and its status as a major financier of the United Nations. Of course, any expansion of the U.N. Security Council should include Japan (and perhaps India and Brazil as well).
With China's mission to space and Olympic success long gone from the nation's headlines, the Party has found a new nationalistic distraction for rising social unrest caused in China's countryside. Despite China's emergence as a global economic superpower, the nation is plagued by a widening urban-rural income gap. China's state-run media, however, fails to report on such events. And because foreign reporters are granted limited access to the countryside, social discontent in the countryside is rarely covered by international news agencies as either.
In the absence of nationwide economic development, the Party is utilizing widespread anti-Japanese sentiment to fuel the nationalism on which the government's legitimacy depends.
For this reason, increasing pressure on China to revalue its currency is extremely untimely. A revaluation of China's currency will only kindle the flames of social unrest and place unnecessary pressure on the Chinese central government. While the ballooning U.S. current account deficit is partly due to China's undervalued currency, it is by no means the only source. (Note: To maintain their currency peg, the Chinese government hoards a large amount of U.S. currency in the form of U.S. Treasury Bonds, of which they currently possess over U.S. $500 billion in their foreign reserves coffers).
In conclusion, a word of advice for the U.S. government: Instead of causing trouble for China, advise U.S. citizens to leave some money in the bank.
Jason E. Friedman is a senior majoring in history, with a focus on Chinese history. He is currently abroad at Hong Kong University.
