A cause for war, but not a cause for support

In the beginning of October, Political science professor Malik Mufti made the case that while concerns for security and humanitarianism had merit, they were not worth a war that could "lead to high casualties, inflame the Arab world, and strain relations with allies." Sufficient cause for war must outweigh these undesirable consequences. Such a cause exists, he said, in the prospects of avoiding a larger conflict than the one presently before us, and the opportunity for a US commitment to Iraq "comparable" to its efforts in Germany and Japan after World War Two. This would include giving the Kurds of northern Iraq sufficient autonomy and a "genuine" effort to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Even if Mufti's calculation of appropriate reasons for going to war is correct, there are problems with supporting war for those reasons under the present circumstances. Notably there is an alternative to war: unfettered weapons inspection. This would severely limit Iraq's aggressive tendencies and capabilities, and reduce the calamity and likelihood of any future conflict. Also important, weapons inspections do not carry the unsavory humanitarian and diplomatic consequences of war.

In the absence of weapons inspections, which is becoming a more likely possibility, the question remains: is the elimination of a theoretical massive conflict and installation of a "more liberal and inclusive order that can serve as a model for the rest of the Arab world" worth a war? Maybe it is. War, however, may only be supported at this time if it is reasonable to believe the US will follow war with the required commitment. Anything less will result in a situation, Mufti states, worse than the current one. Unfortunately, it is not reasonable to believe the US will do what is needed, making war against Iraq unsupportable.

The Bush administration, from the beginning, has framed the Iraq issue in terms of war and "regime change," not in terms of post-war Iraq. Questions of security, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have been repeatedly cited as reasons to go to war. Saddam's pathetic human rights record has been mentioned, but has become a secondary reason for invasion. Additionally, the reluctant consideration of weapons inspections, are a mere half-hearted attempt to assuage allied concerns of US' unwarranted, unilateral action. This would address the administration's concerns regarding weapons of mass destruction, and participation of the United Nations, which would surely be a partner in post-war Iraq, have been treated as an afterthought.

Instead of pushing for Iraqi compliance with new unfettered weapons inspections, the administration has been complacent, standing back and saying "I told you so" when Iraq rebuffs inspector demands. According to Tuesday's New York Times, the administration is now hoping to provoke internal rebellion. This would not only relieve the US of any post-Saddam responsibility, but also call into question the legitimacy of a US role in shaping any new government. In every way, Bush proves to be concerned only with the immediate future of Iraq and the US.

Moreover, the administration has yet to make a convincing argument that Iraq presents an imminent threat that deserves attention now, rather than any time during the first year of Bush's presidency, for example. In 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell was calling for "smart sanctions," not "regime change." Today, evidence of Iraq's ties to al Qaeda is limited to Bush rhetoric and unconfirmed reports of an Iraqi meeting with al Qaeda and the presence of an al Qaeda operative in an Iraqi hospital. While Bush suggests that Iraq may acquire nuclear capabilities in a year, US intelligence says it will more like ten years. Such floundering for reasons to go to war and avoiding suggestions of a long-term commitment suggest that perhaps the administration's real motive for war is not human rights or security but oil and/or politics. If this is the case, which is not so far-fetched, then the administration would have little desire to commit anything more to Iraq than is absolutely necessary for access to Iraq's huge oil reserves. Especially considering the administration's deep, far reaching ties to the oil industry and the suspicious timing of the administration's call for action.

Even when support of democratic freedoms is an explicitly stated policy, the administration has been less than steadfast and unwavering. Egypt's incarceration of Saad Eddin Ibrahim and other democracy advocates has brought a belated and weak response from Washington. The administration has turned a blind eye in Pakistan to Gen. Pervez Musharraf's assault on democratic norms and consolidation of power. And this spring, the White House immediately stated its acceptance of a most undemocratic coup in Venezuela and then waited patiently until it was apparent that the coup would fail and the rest of Latin America had denounced the coup, to express its own disapproval.

In Afghanistan, though the US has been the largest monetary donor to the new government, the US has not readily supported the infant and weak Afghani government with non-monetary but perhaps more valuable goods, such as a national security force to aid in the consolidation of power and preservation of peace among feuding warlords. If the Bush administration is unwilling to do what is needed in Afghanistan as a member of a multilateral coalition, what will happen to Iraq following a war that will no doubt have considerably less international support?

So far, it has been assumed that a liberal, "better" regime can be implemented. This assumption may be unfounded. Iraq is home to a spectrum of religious sects and ethnicities. Rival resistance groups are already fighting over post-Saddam Iraq and the Iraqi people, according to recent reports by New York Times columnists, may not be looking forward to an American liberation as much as (our) conventional wisdom would hold. The effect of these conditions will be (even more) astronomical cost to a successful post-war Iraq.

As for Israel and Palestine, and the necessity for a "genuine" attempt to resolve the problem, the fact that Mufti calls for a change in policy reveals that the administration has done unsatisfactory work. It is difficult believe the administration will adopt new policies or renewed effort after an invasion of Iraq.

With little reason to expect a commitment needed to avoid what Mufti calls "a true nightmare," and many reasons to expect much less, the Bush administration's quest for war cannot be supported with Mufti's argument.



Sam Abrams is a sophomore who has yet to declare a major.